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You Say You Want a Revolution:
Argentina's Recovered Factory
Movement
By ADAM DAVID COLE*

Introduction
The Recovered Factory Movement in Argentina - in which
workers assume control and ownership of factories abandoned by
their owners - has piqued the interest of social activists worldwide.
While the pragmatic impact of approximately 200 recovered
businesses in a country of 38 million may be quite small, the
movement's symbolic effect has been profound. ZNet, CorpWatch,
War Resisters League, No Sweat, IndyMedia, and other leftist groups
and publications have lauded the occupation and recovery of
bankrupt businesses as a praiseworthy example of the proletariat
resisting the ills of capitalism through direct action.
Such groups look to the movement as a source of inspiration.
Yeidy Rosa of Nonviolent Activist called it "a concrete economic
alternative to corporate capitalism if ever there was one."' The hope
is that workers and activists in other countries will learn from the
movement and apply that knowledge to their own situations.
Despite a noticeable buzz within leftist circles, the Recovered
Factory Movement has received little more than a cursory
examination from its enthusiasts. Missing from the discourse are
more in-depth analyses and meaningful debates. The dearth of any
* J.D. candidate, May 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
would like to thank Ugo Mattei for giving me the idea for this article; Dr. Luis A.
Caro for his time and thoughts on the movement; and the workers of the Recovered
Factory Movement, whose daily struggle for existence is a source of inspiration.
1. Yeidy Rosa, A New Form of Resistance. Argentina's Recovered Factories,
NONVIOLENT AcTIVIST, May-June 2005, available at <www.warresisters.org/nva05054.htm>.
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significant legal analysis is especially troubling because workers must
strategically navigate the Argentine legal system to become lawful
Occupied businesses currently fighting for
factory owners.
expropriation - a process where the government takes the property
from the absent owner and transfers it to the workers - are struggling
against similar legal quagmires. Those seeking to learn fom. the
Recovered Factory Movement can only do so by uncovering the legal
processes that the workers endure and examining the policy
implications of such property expropriation.
This note attempts to nudge the discourse in a substantive
direction by explaining the pertinent law, discussing the changes
sought by the movement, and analyzing the accompanying policy
issues. This note seeks to serve as a starting point to encourage more
exhaustive treatment of the relevant laws and issues. Part I discusses
the historical context of the Recovered Factory Movement. Part II
summarizes Argentine expropriation and bankruptcy law, as well as
the legal changes sought by the two main groups within the
movement. Part III frames the policy debate and analyzes the policy
implications of the proposed legal changes.

I. Historical Background
A. Economic and Political Crisis
The Recovered Factory Movement in Argentina is preceded by a
devastating economic and political crisis that reached its apex in 2001.
In 1992, President Carlos Menem sought to retard inflation through
privatization.2 Menem adopted a free market approach to trade and
business, and instituted a one-to-one peg of the Argentine peso to the
U.S. dollar.3 While these policies succeeded in slowing the rate of
inflation and increasing growth, the peso-dollar peg devastated
Argentine exports and created massive debt.4 Argentina slipped into
a severe recession in 1998, culminating in $132 billion of debt by the
end of 2001.'

2. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note.: Argentina, Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, Dec. 2005, at <www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26516.htm> (visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
3. Id
4. Id
5. Argentina'sEconomic Meltdown: Causes and Remedies: HearingBefore the
Subcommittee on InternationalMonetary Policy and Trade of the Committee on
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President Fernando de la Rua was elected in 1999 and attempted
to bail out Argentina's depressed economy through austerity
measures. 6 On November 30, 2001, de la Rua put a $1000 per month
cap on individual bank withdrawals.7 The country responded with
violent protests and political upheaval ensued.8 De la Rua was ousted
from office on December 20, 2001, and Argentina saw four presidents
in office over the next ten days. 9 That same month, Argentina
defaulted on $88 billion in debt - the biggest debt default by any
sovereign in history.0
On January 1, 2002, Eduarde Duhalde became president and
began to undo the peso-dollar peg by devaluing the peso.1" The
government converted all dollar debts into pesos,1213 which depleted
middle class savings and caused widespread poverty.
Despite this economic downturn, Argentina has remained
relatively stable in the wake of the 2001 crisis. 4 Since the election of
President Nestor Kirchner in May of 2003, public demonstrations
have diminished.15 Thanks in part to Kirchner's economic policies,
Argentina's economy has seen yearly growth of eight percent for each
of the past three years.1 6 Unemployment rates have dropped while
the amount of exports and investment has risen. 7 Finally, Kirchner
solidified political support in the 2005 legislative elections by gaining
ground in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies."
Notwithstanding recent stability and growth, Argentina
continues to face long-standing hurdles such as high unemployment,19
Financial Services, 107th Cong. 3 (2002) (statement of Rep. Doug Bereuter,
Chairman, H. Committee on Financial Services), available at <commdocs.house.gov/
committees/bank/hba77785.000/hba77785_0f.htm>.
6. Id
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. U.S. Dep't of State, 2005 Investment Climate Statement - Argentina, at
<www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/41948.htm> (visited Nov. 12, 2006).
11. Infoplease, Argentina, at <www.infoplease.com/ipa/AO107288.html> (visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
12. Argentina'sEconomic Meltdown, supra note 5.
13. Id.
14. See id; U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 2.
15. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 2.
16. Infoplease, supra note 11.
17. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 2.
18. Id.
19. Argentina's unemployment rate in 2005 was 11.6%. CIA - The World
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low wages,20 and widespread poverty.21
B. FactoryandBusiness Recovery
President Menem's inflation-fighting agenda of the 1990s favored
big business and investment. Businesses were given state subsidies,
private credits, tax breaks, and other forms of government

assistance. 222 Some companies skipped out on paying worker salaries
and creditors.23
During the 2001 crisis, thousands of factories and businesses
went bankrupt, closed down, and were abandoned by their owners. 24
Many owners left at the gravest point of the crisis. Avi Lewis,
Filmmaker of The Take," a documentary about the recovered factory
movement, remarked, "Forty billion dollars of foreign capital actually
drove to the airport in the dead of night at the peak of the crash."26
This left the workers with no jobs, and in some cases, unpaid wages.
While most workers of abandoned and bankrupt factories chose
to look for work elsewhere, some workers occupied their factories.
Their purpose was to keep the factory in production, prevent the
government from auctioning the building and machinery, and
establish a legal right to operate and eventually own the factory.28

Factbook - Argentina, at <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/
ar.html#Econ> (visited Nov. 12, 2006).
20. The average monthly salary is 600 pesos, or around $208. Marie Trigona,
Argentine Workers Fight for Wages, ZNET, Aug. 23, 2005, available at
<www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2005-08/23trigona.cfm>;
conversion made on
Nov. 12, 2006, using X-rates.com, at <www.x-rates.com/d/ARS/ table.html> (visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
21. As of June 2004, 44% of the population still lived below the poverty line.
International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2005 Article IV
Consultation with Argentina, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 05/83, June 30,
2005, available at <www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2005/pn0583.htm>.
22. Esteban Magnani, The work of changing minds: Recovered factories in
Argentina, ZNET, Dec. 17, 2003, available at <www.zmag.org/weluser.htm> (follow
"search" hyperlink; search "Esteban Magnani"; follow "4. The work of changing
minds" hyperlink).
23. Id.
24. The Current: Part 2, interview with Avi Lewis (CBC Radio One radio
broadcast Mar. 29, 2005), available at <www.cbc.ca/thecurrent/2005/200503/
20050329.html> (follow "Part 2" hyperlink).
25. (Barna Alper Productions 2004).
26. The Current:Part2, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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In a typical case, the workers form a cooperative. 9 The
cooperative creates a plan for self-management and argues that, as a
creditor"° of a bankrupt company, the cooperative should be
reimbursed with the factory's physical assets - that is, the factory
itself." The municipal or provincial legislature passes a temporary
expropriation law, giving the workers a legal right to work3 2 for two
years. 33 After the temporary permit expires, the cooperative tries to
raise enough money to reimburse the government for its
indemnification of creditors.34 The workers then fight to have the
legislature pass a permanent, factory-specific expropriation law that
gives the workers ownership over the factory.35 Convincing the
legislature to pass case-by-case expropriation laws is often difficult
because many jurisdictions have never passed any expropriation
laws.36 The process of writing legislation is more arduous when the
legislatures have no model from which to follow.
While many workers endure this process in recovering factories,
there is no such thing as a "typical" factory recovery because many of
the cooperatives have pursued different channels in their fight fo"
control.37 Keeping this divergence in mind is crucial when considering
possible changes to existing Argentine law.
IH. Legal Aspects
A. Current Argentine Law
The current Argentine Bankruptcy Law was passed in 1995"8 and

29. Id.
30. The workers are creditors of the bankrupt business because, among other
things, the company owes the workers back pay and the workers have contributed
money toward pensions. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id
33. Marie Trigona, Zanon, Argentina, ZNET, Mar. 18, 2004, available at
<www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2004-03/18trigona.cfm>.
34. Telephone Interview with Dr. Luis Alberto Caro (Feb. 6, 2006) (unavailable).
35. Id.
36. Dr. Luis Alberto Caro, Aspectos Centrales de la Reforma a la Ley de
Concursos y Quiebras, Movimiento Nacional de Fabricas Recuperadas, Apr. 19,
2004, at <www.fabricasrecuperadas.org.ar/article.php3?id-article=48> (visited Nov.
12, 2006).
37. The Current.:Part2, supra note 24.
38. The 1995 Bankruptcy Law is a modification of the previous Bankruptcy Law
number 19,551, enacted in 1972 and later modified by law number 22,917 in 1983.
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is codified in the Commercial Code as law number 24,522 de
Concursos y Quiebras.39 Normally, when a business goes bankrupt in
Argentina, the courts order the company's assets to be liquidated
through public auction.40 Liquidation must take place within four
months of the date of bankruptcy, and in exceptional cases, can be
extended for thirty days by the judge.4' The proceeds of the
liquidation go first to the crediting banks, then to the workers, and
finally to the state.42
Under Article 189 of the Bankruptcy Law, a bankrupt factory
can immediately restart production only by a judicially granted
exception. 43 A judge may grant such an exception if there is evidence
that the interruption would cause grave damage to the creditors'
interests and to the conservation of the business' assets.44
The Argentine Constitution protects private property, but also
sets forth the conditions for its expropriation. Article 17 of the
Constitution provides, "Property may not be violated, and no
inhabitant of the Nation can be deprived of it except by virtue of a
interest
sentence based on law. Expropriation for reasons of public
45
must be authorized by law and previously compensated.,
In 1948, Argentina passed Expropriation Law number 21,499.46
Article 1 of the law states that public utility is the legal cornerstone of
expropriation. 47 To this end, the government has applied the law to
National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, The New Bankruptcy Law in
Argentina: an Overview, at <www.natlaw.com/pubs/sparbrl.htm> (visited Nov. 12,
2006).
39. Id
40. Law No. 24,522, Aug. 7, 1995, Cod. Com., Ley de Concursos y Quiebras, art.
205, available at <html.rincondelvago.comley-24522-de-concursos-y-quiebras-deargentina.html> (visited Nov. 12, 2006); Pablo Waisberg, Recovered Business
at
available
1,
2005,
Dec.
PRESS,
AMERICA
Brainstorm, LATIN
<www.latinamericapress.org/article.asp?IssCode=&lanCode=l&artCode=4492>.
41. Law No. 24,522, Aug. 7, 1995, art. 217.
42. Pablo Waisberg, Argentina: Workers Take FactoriesInto Their Own Hands,
LATIN AMERICA PRESS, Nov. 21, 2002, available at <www.corpwatch.org/
article.php?id=4930>.
43. Law No. 24,522, Aug. 7, 1995, art. 189.
44. Id.
45. Const. Arg., § 17, available at <www.senado.gov.ar/web/interes/constitucion/
english.php>.
46. Dr. Luis Alberto Caro, La expropiacidn de plantas fabriles es una salida
viable, Movimiento Nacional de Fabricas Recuperadas, Sept. 17, 2003, at
<www.fabricasrecuperadas.org.ar/article.php3?idarticle=3> (visited Nov. 12,2006).
47. Law No. 21,499, Ley de Expropiaciones, art. 1, available at
<www.portaldeabogados.com.ar/codigos/21499.htm>.
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build public works such as infrastructure.48
The Law of Expropriation sets forth two types of expropriation:
regular and irregular.49 Regular expropriation requires the individual
or individuals seeking expropriation to indemnify the judge before
taking possession. ° Irregular expropriation, on the other hand,
occurs when possession precedes indemnification." Argentine law
allows irregular expropriation in the following cases:
(a) When a law exists declaring the good a public utility, the state
may take the good prior to the completion of indemnification;
(b) When a law exists declaring the good a public utility but the
good is unavailable or difficult to obtain under normal conditions;
(c) When the state imposes on the holder of the good an illegal
restriction or limitation that injures his or her property rights.5 2
Factories and their contents can be expropriated5 3 since the
Expropriation Law provides that any good may be the object of
expropriation. 4 Workers seeking to expropriate a factory must first
create a cooperative, which makes the workers a legal entity.5 Law
number 20,377, as well as the resolutions passed by both the Instituto
Nacional de Asociativismo y Economfa Social (INAES) and the
Organo Local Competente, govern the formation of cooperatives. 6
A worker cooperative occupying a factory can seek irregular
expropriation of the factory under subsection (a) of Title 51." To do
this, the cooperative must present a proposal to the legislature
declaring the factory a common good and requesting expropriation. 8
If the government chooses to expropriate the factory, the government
must pay an indemnity to the court, which is used to pay the creditors.

48. Caro, supra note 46.
49. Id.
50. Id

51. See id.
52. Law No. 21,499, Ley de Expropiaciones, art. 51, available at
<www.portaldeabogados.com.ar/codigos/21499.htm>.
53. Caro, supra note 46.
54. Id. at art. 4.
55. Magnani, supra note 22.
56. Dr. Luis Alberto Caro, ZC~mo Se Constituye Una Cooperativa de Trabajo,
Movimiento
Nacional
de Fabricas Recuperadas,
Aug. 31, 2004,
at
<www.fabricasrecuperadas.org.ar/article.php3?id-article=56> (visited Nov. 12, 2006).
57. See Caro, supra note 46.
58. Magnani, supranote 22.
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Finally, the workers must reimburse the government for the amount
that it paid to the court. 9 The property is deemed expropriated once
the cooperative has indemnified the judge.'
B. BankruptcyLaw Reform
Dr. Luis Alberto Caro, president of the 'National 1M1ovcment of
Factories Recovered by the Workers (MNFRT), has spearheaded an
Proponents of
effort to reform Argentina's Bankruptcy Law.3
Bankruptcy Law reform believe that the right to work should be
This idea is
preeminent during Argentina's times of crisis. 62
supported by the Argentine Constitution, which grants the right "to
work and perform any industry" to all inhabitants of the nation.
MNFRT seeks four principal reforms of the current Bankruptcy
Law: 1) immediate continuation of production; 2) placing the rights of
unpaid workers and creditors on equal footing; 3) direct sale of goods
to the workers; and 4) suspension of mortgage and securities
61
seizures .
1. Immediate continuationofproduction
As stated above, a judge may order production to continue only
by exception. 6' When this occurs, continuation is administered by a
trustee who represents the business during the bankruptcy
proceedings.65 If reformed, the law would allow a worker cooperative66
to keep a factory in operation simply by making a formal request.
Under this law, the judge would be required to allow the cooperative
to continue operating the factory immediately after notifying the
trustee of continuation. 67 The reformed law would also provide that

59. Caro, supranote 34.
60. Law No. 21,499, at art. 29.
61. Caro, supranote 34.
62. Caro, supra note 36. The Argentine Constitution lists the right "to work and
perform any industry" first among the rights granted to all inhabitants of the nation.
Const. Arg., § 14, available at <www.senado.gov.ar/web/interes/constitucion/
english.php> (visited Nov. 12, 2006).
63. Caro, supranote 36.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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continuation be administered by the cooperative, rather than the
trustee.68
2. Placingthe rights of unpaid workers and creditorson equal
footing
Workers' interests are subordinate under the current law. Their
interests are suspended at the moment bankruptcy is declared and
they are indemnified for only 50% of their interests. 69 In addition,
their credits in the bankruptcy proceedings are given special privilege
only regarding raw materials, merchandise, and machinery, but not
with respect to the commerce fund, trademarks, and patents. Finally,
their credits in the bankruptcy proceedings cannot be used toward
expropriating goods'0 .7'
By contrast, bank creditors' interests are privileged. Their
interests are not suspended until the moment of effective payment,
they are indemnified for 100% of their bankruptcy credits, and they
can recover their bankruptcy credits when the goods are paid for.72
The law as reformed would recognize the interests of workers
from the moment of bankruptcy until effective payment and would
allow the workers to be compensated for 100% of their bankruptcy
credits. The law would also extend the special privilege of workers'
credits to the commercial fund, trademarks, and patents, and would
permit workers to use their credits toward the commercial fund and
to acquire machinery, raw materials, merchandise, trademarks, and
patents.73
3. Directsale ofgoods to the workers
As it stands, current Bankruptcy Law requires the judge to call
The judge may
for bidding or submit the goods to auction.
adjudicate the sale of the goods directly to the workers only in special
cases. 75 The proposed reform would allow the workers to make an

68. Id.
69. Law No. 20,744, Contrato de Trabajo, art. 247
<www.loshornoslp.com.ar/capaitacion/noticias/ley-de-trabajo.htm>.
70. Law No. 24,522, Aug. 7, 1995, art. 211.
71. Caro, supra note 36.
72. Id.
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Law No. 24,522, art. 213; Waisberg, supra note 40.

available

at
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offer for the direct purchase of the goods at a price appraised by the
court.7 6

4. Suspension of Mortgageand SecuritiesSeizures
Finally, MNFRT proposes to suspend all mortgage and securities
seizures and extend liquidation by a period of no less than 24 months,
as determined by the judge. This gives the workers an opportunity to
purchase the goods directly."
C. NationalExpropriationLaw
Fronted by the National Recovered Businesses Movement
(MNER), a faction of workers in recovered factories, such as the
workers at Zan6n ceramics factory, seek a more fundamental
challenge to existing law." MNER seeks to nationalize the recovered
factories, giving ownership to the government and control to the
worker cooperatives.79
Specifically, MNER seeks a National
Expropriation Law that applies to all recovered businesses; a
government subsidy of 10,000 pesos for each recovered business;
government indemnification of workers'
credits; and the
establishment of a special retirement plan for workers of recovered
businesses. 8° Under these changes, the state would pay the creditors
and the workers, but the workers would not be required to indemnify
the government."
III. Analysis
A. Characterizingthe debate
The changes sought by MNFRT and MNER vary greatly in
scope and approach. The passage of MNER's nationalization plan
would have dramatic and widespread consequences. A National

76. Caro, supra note 36.
77. Id
78. See LAVACA, SIN PATRON:

FABRICAS Y EMPRESAS RECUPERADAS POR SUS
TRABAJADORES: UNA HISTORIA, UNA GUfA, 99 (Lavaca ed.) (2004). Eduardo Murua,

president of MNER, stated, "[I]t is true that we question not only private property,
but the entire system." Id.
79. C6cile Raimbeau, Argentina: the Coops' Dividend, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, October 2005, available at <mondediplo.com/2005/10/13survey>.

80.

LAVACA,

supra note 78, at 100.

81. Caro, supranote 34.
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Expropriation Law would have the sweeping effect of expropriating
every single occupied business in Argentina. MNER's plan would
also require the government to subsidize all recovered businesses in
various ways.
By contrast, MNFRT's Bankruptcy Law reforms take a more
moderate, piecemeal approach. MNFRT's amendment to the law
would favor continuing production, honor workers' rights to unpaid
wages, and allow cooperatives to purchase factory goods. However,
these reforms would still require recovered factories to undergo
expropriation on a case-by-case basis, similar to current law.
The disparity between MNER's radical approach and MNFRT's
more moderate approach is considerable.
However, since the
changes sought by both MNFRT and MNER will facilitate the
expropriation of bankrupt businesses by worker cooperatives, the
difference between the two approaches is merely one of degree. In
the context of bankrupt businesses, both movements value the
government's right to expropriate property and an individual's right
to work over a citizen's inviolable right to property ownership.
Specifically, MNER and MNFRT believe the government should
act as an intermediary to effectively transfer private property from
one individual to another. 8 This belief inherently devalues the
sanctity of private property, which is why the Recovered Factory
Movement has sparked heated debate between business interests, the
government, workers, and social activists.
Two main issues encapsulate this debate: 1) whether the right to
work is at least as important to the right to private property in this
context; and 2) whether a cooperatively owned factory can be
considered a "public interest" within the meaning of section 17 of the
Argentine Constitution. The Argentine Constitution recognizes both
the right to work and the right to private property, leaving the courts
to interpret the public interest requirement of expropriation. An
analysis of the two aforementioned issues turns largely on public
policy.
The controversy outlined above centers around rights and duties
that are substantially similar to the eminent domain debate in the
United States. At issue in the United States is the government's use
of its eminent domain power - stemming from the Fifth

82. As used here, "individual" includes cooperatives.
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Amendment's Takings Clause83 - to effectuate private-transferee
takings, whereby the government expropriates property for private
use. This note uses the policy arguments of the eminent domain
debate as a framework for discussing the implications of the changes
sought by MNER and MNFRT.
B. PublicPolicyAnalysis
The public policy arguments commonly discussed in eminent
domain debates fall into the following categories: theoretical issues,
economic concerns, and social implications and fairness. While these
arguments counsel against liberalizing Argentina's expropriation
laws, there are persuasive responses in favor of MNFRT's proposed
changes. On the other hand, the arguments in favor of MNER's
changes are less persuasive because the group's statehood scheme is
too threatening to the status quo.
1. Theoreticalissues
Skeptics are wont to characterize expropriation as a symbolic
blow to the institution of private property. As one case recognized,
"'The power of expropriation is such an interference with the right of
property that it should not readily be implied."'8" Expropriating
property for private industry rather than public use is also considered
contrary to the free market model because it infringes on economic
liberalism.85
While small modifications to expropriation law may not cause
immediate drastic change, some argue such reforms may lay the
groundwork for the government to further expand and eventually
abuse its power of expropriation.86 In Cuba, for instance, Castro
amended the constitutional laws protecting property from
confiscation.' Castro's amendment paved the way for discriminatory

83. U.S. Const. amend.V.
84. Andrew Bechard, A Comparison of US.- Canadian Excess Condemnation,
Expropriation andProperty Taking,9 INPUB.INTEREST 3,7 (1989).
85. Russell A. Brine, Containing the Effect of Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff On Takings for PrivateIndustry, 71 CORNELL L.REV.428, 449 and fn. 143
(1986).
86. See Thomas Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of
Eminent Domain,51 GEO. WASH. L.REV.355, 378 (1983).
87. Jose A. Ortiz, The Illegal Expropriation of Propertyin Cuba: A Historical
and Legal Analysis of the Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes for a PostSocialist Cuba, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 328 (2000).
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takings utilized to punish political opposition.8 The fear is that liberal
expropriation laws in Argentina might similarly allow the government
to take property arbitrarily.
These arguments are unpersuasive because they present quixotic
conceptions of the institution of private property and the free market
system. The right to private property is never absolute. Thomas Ross
argues in his law review article, "The notion of absolute security of
private property ownership is more an illusion than a reality in
today's society of zoning, eminent domain, and 'balancing the
equities.' Thus, the threat from private-transferee takings may be
equally illusory."'8 9
Neither is any capitalist system truly laissez-faire. Even in the
most hands-off neo-liberal societies, state interference in commerce is
pervasive, including government subsidies of industry through tax
breaks and other forms of assistance.
Considering the frequency with which modern governments
compromise private property rights and the free market system,
moderate reforms to Argentina's Bankruptcy Law will not gravely
alter these institutions, whether the effect is symbolic or real.
Additionally, reforms that facilitate expropriation of bankrupt and
abandoned businesses will not harm private property rights because
the original owners of these businesses have already relinquished
their rights upon abandonment.
However, MNER's nationalization scheme threatens property
rights and the capitalist system. Such a scheme would require
significant government resources and would require the government
to act in a capacity more attuned to socialism than capitalism.
MNER's proposal is more threatening; it strikes at the foundation of
the capitalist infrastructure, giving critics more reason to fear a
slippery slope into socialism.
2. Economic concerns
Critics of the Recovered Factory Movement believe that liberal
expropriation laws will hurt Argentina's economy. Neo-conservatives
look to expropriation's public use requirement' as the primary means

88. Id.
89. Ross, supra note 86, at 380.
90. The "public use" requirement in the United States and the "public interest"
requirement in Argentina are essentially the same - the government may take
property only to serve a public purpose.
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of protecting against the negative economic effects caused by
expropriation. Thomas J. Coyne posits,
The Framers of the Constitution designed the public use clause to
limit government power and, more specifically, to protect the rights
of private property owners in the possession of their property.
Such protection promotes security in property and, in turn, secures
investment backed expectations. To this extent the public use
clause encourages investment and economic growth.91
However, expropriation critics believe liberal expropriation laws
that allow for private property takings erode the public use
requirement and chill investment. They argue that expropriation can
have both specific and general demoralization consequences.'
Specific demoralization refers to the frustration felt by the individual
whose property has been expropriated.93 General demoralization
costs occur when citizens become aware of private expropriation and
become hesitant to invest in property they believe may be subject to
expropriation. 94 If the specter of expropriation is felt widely enough,
skeptics believe investors will be reluctant to invest, which will
stagnate economic growth. In Argentina, for example, a change in
the law might cause an investor to believe that her capital is more
susceptible to government takeover, despite the fact that the
Argentine government can only expropriate her property if her
business goes bankrupt and she abandons her property. Such fears
may actually be realized if Argentina's legal climate remains
uncertain and expropriation laws are further liberalized.
Although the government is required to compensate owners of
expropriated property, critics point out that compensation is
sometimes delayed and less than adequate. In Costa Rica, for
example, expropriation is allowed only if the government provides
fair and prompt compensation. 9 In practice, however, the Costa
Rican government does not always provide fair or prompt
compensation to the affected property owners. 96 If the Argentine
91. Thomas J. Coyne, HawaiiHousingAuthority v. Midkiff A FinalRequiem for
the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain?,60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 388, 402
(1985) (citations omitted).
92. Ross, supra note 89, at 376-377.
93. Id
94. Id at 377.
95. Alejandro Ferrate, Esq., Foreign Direct Investment in Costa Rica After the
"Death"of CBI, 2 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 119, 129 (1996).
96. Id.
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government similarly failed to provide prompt and just compensation
to property owners, this could destabilize the economy.
Critics such as C6cile Raimbeau of Le Monde diplomatique
further contend that transferring ownership of a business to a
cooperative creates an inefficient market that is unattractive to
multinational businesses. Raimbeau explains,
Cooperatives benefit mutually from becoming each other's clients
and suppliers and allowing credit. Most of what they produce goes
to other industries, rather than to the consumer... 'the
multinationals don't want to deal with cooperatives, and certainly
not with salvaged businesses. The workers can get round this by
selling to a go-between who sells on to 9the
7 manufacturers, but they
lose a percentage on these transactions.'
While non-capitalist ownership models may be attractive to
workers, neo-liberals fear cooperatives may not be best suited to
function in a free market system. The fear is that Argentina's
economy will suffer if worker cooperatives cannot compete in the
market.
Some also believe that liberal expropriation laws will threaten
Argentina's relationship with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Argentina has relied on loans from the IMF to promote
growth for the past 50 years.98 Opponents of expropriation argue that
the Recovered Factory Movement challenges the IMF's policy of
normalizing property rights to create "certainty and stability" for
capital.99 They believe the IMF might take measures to deter
Argentina's anti-capitalist economic policies in favor of fiscal
conservatism.'0° "If the IMF put pressure on the government of
Argentina to crack down on the movement, the government would
The IMF may
probably follow their wishes," Lewis stated."1
to cut back
government
Argentine
persuade
the
therefore be able to

97. Raimbeau, supra note 79.
98. See International Monetary Fund, Argentina and the IMF, at <www.imf.org/
external/country/ARG/> (visited Nov. 12, 2006).
99. See Malcolm Rogge, Resolutely Hopeful: The Take: A Film About
Recuperated Factories In Argentina, ZNET, Aug. 8, 2004, available at
<www.zmag.org/weluser.htm> (follow "search" hyperlink; search "Malcolm Rogge";
follow "1. Resolutely Hopeful" hyperlink).
100. Id.
101. Id. Lewis also stated, "The workers understand they are a threat to the
dictates of the IMF... 'we have to see whether the IMF likes the fact that we're
running the factory, and if they decide to crush us, then we're fucked."'
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on expropriation.
Despite these concerns, MNFRT's reforms will not negatively
affect Argentina's economy. Expropriations for private use are
unlikely to demoralize property owners and investors because such
expropriations are extremely rare. As Ross argues, "[B]ecause
private-transferee takings are relatively rare and scattered, they
should not significantly contribute to the insecurity of private
property owners. In making the decision to invest in land, an investor
more likely fears adverse market shifts and land-use regulations than
he fears a private-transferee taking of his land."' 2
Also, factory expropriations are not likely to chill investments in
Argentina. In a country of 38.6 million inhabitants with a GDP of
$152 billion, the expropriation of around 200 factories is relatively
insignificant. "[I]n terms of a national economy," Lewis asserts, "[the
Recovered Factory Movement] is a blip. So it's not in any way going
' 14
to sponsor a national or global change of the economic order."
"This is a drop in the bucket."'0 5 Even if the government pays
inadequate or delayed compensation, and cooperatives are not as
efficient as individual owners, the likelihood that such a small-scale
movement will send waves of doubt through the national and
multinational investment communities is quite small. By contrast, the
importance of liberalizing expropriation laws to occupied businesses
is immense.
Furthermore, the IMF's potential disapproval may not be a
legitimate concern because Argentina has recently shown signs of
cutting its ties with the IMF. On December 15, 2005, President
Kirchner announced that the Argentine government would repay its
entire $9.8 billion debt to the IMF."'
The Economist noted,
"Kirchner has made it clear that his main aim in repaying debt is to
avoid further IMF restraint on his policies."' ' Argentina's extrication
from the IMIF may prove to be sound economic policy given that
Kirchner and many Argentines blame the IMF's policies for the 2001
economic collapse.'08 Some argue that "neo-liberal macro-economic

102.
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104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Ross, supra note 89, at 377.
U.S. Department of State, supranote 2.
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policies have actually undermined 'stability' for productive
investment.""
Thus, pacifying the IMF should not be a primary
concern.
If anything, reforming the Bankruptcy Law may be beneficial to
the Argentine economy. Seventy-nine percent of occupied factories
are productive.1 ° Factories such as Zan6n, which has hired 170 new
workers since its occupation, "' pay their workers 800 pesos per month
(200 pesos above the national average) and has reduced factory
accidents from 25-30 per month to zero.'1 2 The idea behind the
reforms is to avoid the waste caused by closing a factory, auctioning
off its assets, and requiring the purchaser to build his own business
from scratch. Instead, the expropriation process preserves existing
business relationships and allows capital to stay in motion by letting
production continue.
MNER's more radical changes, on the other hand, may prove to
be economically infeasible. The current law requires a cooperative to
submit a proposal setting forth the workers' business plan. A
National Expropriation Law, however, would declare expropriation
of all recovered companies, regardless of how well-suited a given
cooperative is to carry on the business. MNER's changes would also
require the government to incur the cost of subsidizing recovered
factories, while current law requires the cooperative to indemnify the
government for payment of creditors. Given these inefficiencies,
MNER's changes do not make for a sound economic policy.
3. SocialImplicationsandFairness
Private-transferee takings are also criticized as being patently
unfair. Expropriations for private use allow private actors to obtain
desired property that might normally be available only above market
price or not at all."' Private takings therefore unjustly enrich the
transferee."'
Expropriation of private property is also considered unfair
because it does not serve a public interest as required by law.
Instead, private takings primarily create a private benefit and at most,
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promote the public interest peripherally."5
Critics in Argentina may similarly argue that worker
cooperatives are unjustly enriched because they obtain ownership of
a factory they otherwise would be unable to purchase on the open
market. Also, factory expropriation only benefits the cooperative's
private interests in keeping their jobs, rather than benefiting the
public.
These contentions are not well founded. First, cooperatives of
recovered factories are not unjustly enriched. In all cases, the
workers were owed months of back pay when the owners left. This
made the workers creditors in the bankruptcy process. MNFRT's
reforms merely seek to apply the money owed to the workers to their
purchase of the business. The supposed "enrichment" of the workers
does not detriment the original owners since they have abandoned
their property and no longer have any legal claim to it.
Second, the assertion that factory recovery does not serve the
public interest is misguided. As Ross claims, "Private benefit is an
inevitable aspect of all significant takings. The construction of a park,
road, or a public building as a result of an ordinary taking will likely
affect the property values of certain citizens. Yet, these private
16
benefits and harms would not justify barring an ordinary taking."'
Thus, the mere fact that worker cooperatives derive a benefit from
the expropriation does not alone make expropriation unfair.
The argument against factory expropriation is also based on an
overly narrow understanding of the public interest requirement.
Allowing cooperatives to continue carrying on production benefits
the public interest by keeping capital moving and strengthening the
economy. The public also benefits from the factories in other ways.
For instance, Zan6n has donated its tiles to community centers and
hospitals, organized community cultural activities at the factory, and
built a community health clinic for an impoverished neighborhood." 7
Factory expropriation under MNFRT's reforms do not pose any
serious fairness concerns.
In contrast, MNER's nationalization plan is questionable.
115. See Ross, supra note 86, at 370 ("If a private citizen is the transferee of
property taken by eminent domain... [t]he taker's sole motivation for the taking
may be to benefit a favored citizen").
116. Id.at 372-373.
117. FaSinPat 117. The "public use" requirement in the United States and the
"public interest"
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, at <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
FaSinPat> (visited Nov. 12, 2006).
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Giving the cooperatives 10,000 pesos per month in government
subsidies, along with permitting the cooperatives to operate their
businesses without indemnifying the government, smacks of unjust
enrichment. While an universal expropriation law may serve the
public interest in some cases, expropriation might harm the public
interest in others. To preserve fairness, the government should have
the discretion to adjudicate expropriations on a case-by-case basis.
Universal expropriations may be too unfair to be accepted by the
Argentine legislature.
Conclusion
In spite of recent growth, Argentina's economy is still coping
with the fallout from its collapse in 2001. As of April 2004, 8,000
factories in Argentina were bankrupt. 18 The vast majority of
bankrupt businesses in Argentina will shut down for good and have
their assets liquidated. This process, while perhaps a necessary evil of
capitalism, takes its toll on the economy. Liquidation of assets leaves
creditors with only partial payment, or in many cases, no payment at
all. The closing of large manufacturing firms causes unemployment
for thousands of workers, many of who dedicated decades of their
lives to a single factory. Moreover, factory closures ruin buyersupplier relationships and other delicate business relations that take
time and resources to forge.
For these reasons, viable alternatives to bankruptcy liquidation
that keep workers employed and factories productive are crucial to
understand and utilize. Factory recovery poses such an alternative.
Based on the above analysis, there are strong policy arguments
supporting MNFRT's proposed Bankruptcy Law reforms. However,
MNER's more radical changes are cause for concern, as they would
pose too drastic a threat to established property and free market
interests.
The Recovered Factory Movement comprises a mere 200
businesses and 15,000 workers, and therefore currently has only a
marginal impact on the economy. However, the methods used and
legal processes endured by the movement are instructive to similarly
situated workers, social activists, policymakers, politicians, lawyers,
and scholars in Argentina and other countries. Indeed, factory
recovery is not limited to Argentina. Workers in Brazil, Peru,
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Venezuela, and Uruguay are undergoing similar struggles for
ownership of bankrupt and abandoned businesses. " 9
While the response to the Recovered Factory Movement has
been enthusiastic, thus far it is lacking in substance. Only through
meaningful debate about the relevant legal and policy issues can the
movement hope to develop an informed discourse.

119. See Waisberg, supra note 42.

